Introduction
I am pleased and honoured to open, with this lecture, the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Cambridge Journal of Economics (CJE). 1 the sense that any argument about what did occur in the past 50 years is meant to evaluate the extent to which the Cambridge School of Economics may have a place (and which place) in the 'economics of the future'.
In recent months, I have been struggling over the preparation of the final draft of a book for the Cambridge University Press, which discusses the achievements and non-achievements of the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics (Pasinetti, forthcoming) .
An undoubtedly intriguing question that underlies part of my book is the following. How could this remarkable School win so many important battles and, at the same time, fail to make of the 'Keynesian revolution' a permanent winning paradigm? They were extremely bright scholars, some of them very original and rigorous, others very prolific in presenting and diffusing the new ideas; all of them were rather unconventional. Yet, they have not been able to keep the 'Keynesian revolution' rolling at a sufficient pace. They eventually failed to establish it as a viable (if not winning) economic paradigm. Why?
I think two types of reasons should be mentioned. There was, first, a temperamental reason. The Cambridge group certainly misbehaved in the process of organising a proper School. In many scientific disputes, they often displayed individualistic attitudes, and sometimes even egoistic behaviour, rather than adopting a spirit of cooperation, which would have kept and fostered the unity of the Keynesian School. Their voices were sometimes discordant. Though they always agreed on fighting the Neoclassical School, they often quarrelled among themselves, usually over trivial issues. But all this could be considered a venial sin, even a colourful imprint of the group, and one that made it unique. In fact, those who could be witnesses for that period (including myself) would argue that the cohesion of the original members of the School was never in doubt. A more serious matter was how this strong cohesion should have taken shape. This was usually done in a way that typically excluded others. It excluded newcomers; it did not pay sufficient attention to the young generation of economists so as to induce them to participate in the discussion and contribute to it on an independent basis. This was in disregard of the obvious fact that any scientific revolution, to keep going, requires new stamina, which eventually becomes essential for facing new challenges and consolidating past victories. Thus, new potential members of the Cambridge School were somehow discouraged or not placed in a position to participate fully.
The role played during the past 25 years by the Cambridge Journal of Economics has, I think, been a remedy against this misbehaviour and lack of wisdom of that part of the original Cambridge group. The Journal and the regular meetings of its Editors have been a receptive and fertile place for a very explicit discussion of any issue, orthodox and non-orthodox, and have acted as an open forum for attracting external contributions, which have enriched the whole economic debate. These features of openness and frank debate, without fear of being considered on the wrong track, were precisely what the original Cambridge group lacked most. The Editors of the Cambridge Journal of Economics should be paid a sincere tribute for what they have done in this respect.
There is, however, a second reason that may help to explain the failure of the Cambridge School in establishing a successful alternative paradigm to mainstream economics. This is a reason that relates to a lack of theoretical cohesion in the various pieces that emerged from the Keynesian School. The Cambridge group paid scant attention to discussing the fundamentals on which an alternative, but coherent, paradigm could be built. This was in part due to the variety of their attitudes. Yet, precisely because of these differences and, at the same time, of the richness of theirapparently various-approaches, an open search for the common foundations of their efforts should have been assigned paramount priority. But this was hardly done. Richard Kahn, the acting organiser of the group, in his Milan 'Mattioli Lectures' (Kahn, 1984) , almost 50 years after the publication of The General Theory, was still referring to the nature and substance of the breakaway from orthodoxy by just reiterating the title of Keynes's book.
I am convinced that the Cambridge Journal of Economics has been helpful in this respect too, but by no means to a sufficient extent. Its founding 'mission statement' of providing 'a focus for theoretical and applied work, with strong emphasis on realism of analysis, the provision and use of empirical evidence, and the formulation of economic policies [based on an] economic approach rooted in the tradition of Marx, Kalecki and Keynes' has attracted many economists willing to refine, assess, adjust and develop the 'Keynesian Revolution'.
Yet, I fear that a satisfactory blueprint for a coherent theoretical framework that could house, beneath one single roof, the development of the existing ideas along the Keynesian lines and most of all the development of entirely new ideas are still lacking. For an economist like myself, who lived through the experience of the original Keynesian group, this need for a solid and comprehensive theoretical framework would seem to be the more urgent and important task to be carried out for the economics of the future.
Looking for theoretical coherence: what makes it so difficult?
While taking a critical view of the Neoclassical paradigm, we should not be so blind as not to recognise its apparent formal solidity and coherence. The question is: will it ever be possible to gain a comparable (hopefully a better) solidity and coherence for an alternative paradigm along Keynesian lines? As one may easily appreciate, this is a question for the future-not one of the past. In the few pages that remain, I should like to concentrate on attempting to answer this key question.
Let me say from the outset that, in my opinion, it is indeed possible to sketch out a coherent basic framework, sufficiently general to capture and absorb into an overall scheme the apparently diverse contributions that have been made already by the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics. Moreover, I feel that it is also possible, by starting from such contributions-and this is the most challenging aspect-to build a complete, cohesive and viable paradigm, alternative to the dominant one. One should recognise, however, that the task involved in constructing such an alternative paradigm is much more complex and difficult than the one which Arrow-DebreuSamuelson and others have had to face for neoclassical economics. And this is for at least two reasons.
First, a basically (Keynesian) coherent framework cannot rely on a closed model. The scheme to be built must also be open to, and to be able to absorb, contributions and ideas coming from other social sciences, as they became relevant to economics. This is particularly true in the fields of human behaviour and social organisation, which require an open eye on what other disciplines have to offer. Second, the reality which the scheme should allow us to investigate cannot be that of an idealised purely competitive market economy, in which goods are given once and for all, and all that is needed is the search for their optimal allocation. If this were the case, the tools already provided by the dominant paradigm for finding the existence (and uniqueness) of an optimal equilibrium would be sufficient. The aim we have is more difficult, but also more challenging. It consists in giving an account of what happens-as Keynes put it-in a 'monetary production economy', which is more complex than a pure exchange stationary economy, because it is intrinsically dynamic, continually affected by history, and subject to changes both in scale and in structure.
Some building blocks provided by the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics
We do not start from nothing. The contributions of the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics are there to help. It may be interesting to review briefly some of the building blocks, which-despite an undoubted lack of homogeneity-can be identified in the works of this School. It may also be interesting to notice that some of the points I shall mention can be seen hinted at in the Notes to Contributors that the CJE still displays on its cover. One can single out-to my mind-at least eight 'constructive' features characterising the works of the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics.
(1) Reality (and not merely abstract rationality) as the starting point of any economic theory. This has been a typical characteristic inherited from Keynes, who had the courage to say-'When the facts change, I change my mind'. The whole Cambridge School showed an aversion to a purely ideal rational reasoning that, though apparently respectful of logic, does not show respect for facts. According to the Cambridge School, any theory needs to be strongly based on factual evidence from the start, and not just be left to be empirically tested at the end. This feature is particularly important when the reality under investigation is that of industrial societies, with their tendency towards change and towards an evolving structure, as against the more static conditions of pre-industrial societies. Kaldor, who often repeated in his own words Keynes's phrase mentioned above, used to begin many of his works with an accurate list of 'stylised facts', that needed to be explained, as he repeatedly stressed (Kaldor, 1961) ; the term 'stylised facts' meaning some empirical regularities that were sufficiently general and persistent, so as to capture some objective features of reality. When the CJE is asking its contributors for 'realism', it touches precisely on this characteristic. (2) Economic logic with internal consistency (and not only formal rigour). The Cambridge School does not rely only on an economic theory that is respectful of facts from the start. It also relies on an economic theory that keeps an overall vigilant eye on economic reality, while the analysis is being carried out. This is particularly important when the economic system under investigation is a typically complex and evolving one, where it is important to single out-and never lose sight of-the underlying emerging patterns. Keynes (1921, p. vff.) , Kahn (1988) , Robinson (1969) , and Kaldor (1989) always stressed that economics is an art, which requires qualitative judgements about seemingly contradictory evidence: it requires intuition to organise a maze of ideas and phenomena into a coherent whole; it needs caution to draw policy implications, because 'the theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy' (Keynes, 1922) . It has also been stressed that the basic theoretical framework should never violate internal consistency. This feature has taken clear prominence in the elaborations of Sraffa's Production of Commodities (1960)-a masterpiece in this respect. Saying that a theory needs internal consistency is not the same thing as saying that it needs 'formal rigour'-a term today adopted to mean the combined use of mathematical language, axiomatic deductive logic and formal proofs. It should be borne in mind that, deliberately, Sraffa's book was not written in purely mathematical language-a choice that Sraffa made, with some vindications and recognitions, even against the advice of distinguished mathematicians 1 whom he consulted, and with whom he discussed at length, in Cambridge. I take it that the CJE captures this characteristic, when it asks the authors 'to use mathematics only when its application is a necessary condition for achieving the stated objective of the paper' (emphasis in the original). . The revival and reappraisal of the Classical economists also seems to be instrumental in helping to insert the contributions of the Cambridge School into a framework mainly devoted to 'production' rather than to 'exchange', which is what is badly needed to understand industrial societies. Again, I take the CJE as stating its interests along these lines when it asks its contributors for an 'approach rooted in the traditions of Marx, Kalecki and Keynes'. (4) Non-ergodic (rather than stationary, timeless) economic systems. The Cambridge School believed that any economic system should be analysed in a framework of historical time. This was true not only for the long run, but also for short-run analysis. The recognition of the importance of historical time is connected to the idea that economic systems do not have a point of rest, and that neither do they allow us to turn the clock back-a notion which is summarised here with the rather technical word of 'non-ergodic'. 2 To put the matter more simply, this means that the future, though connected with the past, can never coincide with it. This characteristic showed itself among the members of the Cambridge School in various ways. Keynes stressed the role of uncertainty and the unpredictability of future events. Sraffa believed that an evolving, unpredictable economic system forces theory, at least to begin with, to take only pictures of reality at a specific point in time, so as to avoid counterfactuals. Joan Robinson, more than anybody else, emphasised this characteristic, by making a sharp distinction between historical time and logical time. While the former is crucial to the understanding of economics because it allows the organisation of the flow of events from an irreversible past to an unknown future, the latter may often become a misleading concept precisely because human history is crucially far away from the idea or the analogy of an hydraulic system, that can be run forwards or backwards, indifferently.
(5) Macroeconomics before microeconomics. The Cambridge School proposed an analysis in which the macroeconomic dimension always came first with respect to the microeconomic dimension. The theoretical propositions of each member of the School always avoided starting from subjective behaviour (or preferences) and from the study of single individuals. The Cambridge economists, from Keynes (1936A, especially ch. 19) to Sraffa (1960, especially ch. 12) showed very clearly that the behaviour of the economic system as a whole is not reducibleexcept under very restrictive conditions-to the sum of its single individual parts. This does not mean a denial of the role of microeconomics as a field of economic investigation, but it does mean the impossibility of explaining crucial economic phenomena on the sole basis of microeconomic behaviour. There are many examples of fallacy of composition that the Cambridge School highlighted, in connection with attempts-by mainstream economists-to extend what is true for the single individual to the behaviour of the economic system as a whole. No one could have stated the difference between macroeconomics and microeconomics better than Keynes himself, when he stressed that '[there is a] vital difference between the theory of economic behaviour of the aggregate and the theory of behaviour of the individual unit' (Keynes, 1936A, p. 85 ).
(6) Disequilibrium and instability (not equilibrium) as the normal state of the industrial economies. This characteristic, which was prominent in Kahn (1972) , Robinson (1976) and Kaldor (1985) , springs from the conviction that the normal state of a modern production economy cannot be likened-in Keynes's words-to the image of 'a flat ocean' (Keynes, 1923) . And for at least two reasons. First, because goods are not given once for all, but are themselves the object of changing conditions. And second, because the demand for goods is highly affected by uncertainty. Kaldor focused his 'Okun Memorial Lectures' at Yale University in 1983 entirely on this characteristic, and called the lectures 'Economics without equilibrium'. The recognition that the economic system may be out of equilibrium and may remain in this condition for a long time removes many thaumaturgic properties of the dominant paradigm, such as the belief in 'Say's Law', in the optimal outcomes of 'the market mechanism', and in the neutrality of money. It calls instead for better policy-making for the economic system than that of laissez faire. On the one hand, this opens up the search for a more comprehensive institutional set-up; on the other, it demands a deeper analysis of the sources that lie behind the instability of economic systems. (7) Economic growth and income distribution as key topics. In a letter to Roy Harrod, after the completion of The General Theory, Keynes (1936B) recognised the need to extend his theoretical framework to dynamic analysis. After the contribution of Harrod himself-Towards a Dynamic Economics (1948)-the topic of economic growth became probably one of those around which the Cambridge group carried on their research more expeditiously and, to a certain extent, more coherently. Since the beginning, the Cambridge School found a connection between economic growth and the distribution of income, and in these two fields they made many original contributions. Sraffa reopened the Pandora's box of Marxian inconsistencies, and offered an entirely new framework (along Classical lines), in which to place the issues concerning income distribution (Sraffa, 1960) . (8) A strong, deeply felt, social concern. The Cambridge group wholeheartedly shared and developed Keynes's view that, in a dynamic industrial economy, an uncritical laissez-faire attitude could not be adopted. Since economic stability could never be taken for granted, the Keynesian group always attempted to give substantiation, with specific proposals, to active economic policy, owing to at least two crucial risks that modern economies are constantly facing-the risk of mass unemployment and the risk of an inequitable distribution of income, both at the national and at the international level.
This list may be a rough, but it seems to me an appealing starting point. Yet, we must recognise, as already mentioned, that a coherent theoretical framework cannot simply grow out of listing a series of building blocks, if they remain unconnected with one another.
We must aim at the achievement of some sort of heuristic device that may allow us to use them to construct a full theoretical scheme, capable of embodying the complexity of a modern industrial economy.
Placing the contributions of the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics in a coherent framework-for the future
How can we tackle the complexity of a dynamic, unstable, economic system? And, above all, how can we manage to deal with this complexity, without losing sight of the many-sometime even contradictory-features of industrial economies? These are two frightening questions such as to discourage the enthusiasm of most, as is revealed sometimes even by papers appearing in the CJE. But we should not give up.
As far as I am concerned, I shall try to give here, in an inevitably brief and incomplete form, a proposal which is argued in detail in my forthcoming book (Pasinetti, forthcoming) .
The place to begin-it seems to me-is to stress convincing reasons why a new paradigm, radically different from the dominant one, should be attempted.
For me, the main reason lies in the first characteristic common to the works of the members of the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics. Theory should start from facts, hence from history. If the course of history shows dramatic and radical change, theory should follow suit.
I have already argued elsewhere (see, in particular, Pasinetti, 1981) that the process of increase in wealth that has taken place in the past few centuries has gone through two quite clearly identifiable phases: the 'phase of commerce' and the 'phase of industry'.
When-after the Middle Ages-a few basic improvements in the technique of transportation led to the discoveries of new lands and extended the horizon of the known world to include countries with climates and products previously unknown, new possibilities of trade were opened up, with a profound impact on the economic conditions of the world. The trading nations were suddenly better off, not because of a rise in world production, but because of better utilisation of the resources that were already available. The neoclassical economic paradigm has all the characteristics to make it suitable for investigating the impact of this historical phase.
But, after the end of the eighteenth century, a dramatic change took place in human history-the 'Industrial Revolution'.
Industry is a process of augmenting wealth through a material increase in the quantity and number of products, to be achieved by the practical application of the advances of science, the division and specialisation of labour, better organisation, invention and utilisation of new sources of energy and new materials. Unlike trade, industry requires continuous changes in the organisational structure of society. Of course trade remains the natural and necessary complement of industry but, as a cause of further increases in wealth, it is bound to subside. Industry, in contrast, is bound to remain a permanent cause of increase in wealth and to become pre-eminent as time goes on, owing to the very nature of its cumulative processes.
My contention is that, if history has changed dramatically in this way, an equally dramatic change is needed in theory, in order to understand, and deal with, what has happened. It is well known that the early title that Keynes gave to his masterpiece in the making was 'The Monetary Theory of Production'-a theory that is aimed at explaining the economies that emerged from the Industrial Revolution. These are economies that move and evolve through time, that show an intricate interaction between natural resources, technological factors and social institutions. Goods are not given once and for all. They are produced and, to an increasing extent, invented anew. Consumption evolves too, as we learn new way of using our goods and our time.
The eight basic features characterising the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics outlined above capture important aspects of the complex economic systems that have emerged from the Industrial Revolution. But they are not enough. We should go further. And I shall be provocative in this respect.
The starting point-I shall stress the word 'starting'-of the heuristic device I am proposing in order to give a coherence to the works of the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics is to be found not in Keynes but in Sraffa. Methodologically, the proposal consists in looking at the complex systems of the modern economies, through two logically distinct-but interconnected-stages.
1 At the first stage, which I shall call the stage of 'pure theory', the focus is on those objective elements of reality that have a high degree of persistence through time. The relationship between these elements should be studied carefully and through an exercise of abstraction organised in a logically coherent theoretical framework. The result, as yet, will not reach an all-comprehensive theoretical framework, but it will provide an essential-and in this sense, a general-economic theory. Unlike the Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium model (which is at the basis of mainstream economics, and which is a closed model) this 'pure theory' inspired by Sraffa is an 'open' theory. It is able to show and clarify basic, objective relations, but it also still contains many degrees of freedom that are left open. It does not offer-nor need it offer-a unique solution. It shows, on the contrary, the possibility-and sometimes the risk-of obtaining many different outcomes. It expresses the effort to show how to deal normatively with certain economic issues. For instance, it shows how to maintain the economic system in a condition of full employment. But, from a logical point of view, the theoretical system does not require the fulfilment of this condition. Logically, it also works with unemployment (just reflecting the facts of real life).
At this point, one may legitimately claim that, in any economic system, these many degrees of freedom will have to be closed, and the obvious source for this closure is through human decisions. I am, in fact, arguing that a full economic analysis is not complete at the first stage of economic investigation, which, following an expression used by Sraffa, I have called the stage of 'pure theory'. We need to enter a second stage of investigation, precisely because a real economic system is a much more complex entity than an essential, objective, coherent, core of logically interconnected elements. There are many mutable, varied, sometime unpredictable events that cannot be ignored by our analysis, if we want to study an actual economic system. I have called this second stage of investigation, for short, the stage of 'institutional analysis', because the main factors it deals with concern individual and social behaviour. It is at this second stage of enquiry that we may introduce different (sometimes alternative) institutional set-ups through which society is organised. Precisely because the first stage of investigation leaves open so many degrees of freedom, we are not constrained at this stage to deal exclusively with only one type of institution (e.g., a 'market economy') or one kind of behaviour (e.g., 'rational' individualistic behaviour), as is the case with the dominant paradigm, although such types of institution and of behaviour are not excluded. I do not need to stress, but rather just to remind my audience, that very many of the contributions of the Cambridge School concern this second (institutional) stage of investigation. I am thinking in particular of Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor. There are many advantages in using this two-stage approach to frame a coherent, non-reductionist, Keynesian-Sraffian theoretical framework. First, by avoiding any subjective hypothesis about human behaviour at the first stage of investigation, we can aim at a theory that, though with many degrees of freedom, is more solid in its structure. Second, by developing a theory that is, so to speak, pre-institutional (in the sense that it is open to diverse kinds of individual and social behaviour), we are enabled later to insert, into its framework, patterns of behaviour which may be various, and indeed even alternative to one another. Third, we are able to open up the second stage of economic investigation to the contributions of other social sciences, which may have much to say about human behaviour, above and beyond what economists may envisage.
Furthermore, we are able to take full account of the historical and geographical specificities of each economic system. When the Cambridge Journal of Economics, in its opening statement, asks the authors 'to contribute to the understanding and treatment of current economic and social issues', I take it that it is confronting us with this kind of openness.
